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Blinding is a methodologic safeguard of treatment evaluation, yet severely understudied empirically.
Mathieu et al.'s theoretical analysis (2014) provided an important message that blinding cannot elimi-
nate potential for bias associated with belief about allocation in randomized controlled trial; just like the
intent-to-treat principle does not guarantee unbiased estimation under noncompliance, the blinded
randomized trial as a golden standard may produce bias. They showed possible biases but did not assess
how large the bias could be in different scenarios. In this paper, we examined their ﬁndings, and
numerically assessed and compared the bias in treatment effect parameters by simulation under
frequently encountered blinding scenarios, aiming to identify the most ideal blinding scenarios in
practice. We conclude that Random Guess and Wishful Thinking (e.g., participants tend to believe they
received treatment) are the most ideal blinding scenarios, incurring minimal bias. We also ﬁnd some
evidence that imperfect or partial blinding can be better than no blinding.
© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Blinding is a critical feature in comparative evaluations to
minimize various biases. Blinded randomized controlled trial (RCT)
is widely accepted as a gold standard when we compare treat-
ments, whenever feasible [1e5]. Blinding can be more relevant and
important to subjective outcomes, such as patient-reported out-
comes. Several authors reviewed the current practice of blinding-
related techniques, assessment and reporting [2,6], and it has
been suggested that unblinding may overestimate the treatment
effect [7,8]. Although the role and importance of blinding are well
recognized in the clinical trial community, statistical investigation
on this topic has been rare, partly due to inherently complicated
and subjective/qualitative nature.
Recently, Mathieu et al. (2014) provided a theoretical analysis
demonstrating that blinding cannot eliminate potential for bias
associated with belief about allocation in RCT, which could be
surprising or counterintuitive for many trialists [1,9]. Speciﬁcally,
they studied a mathematical framework of simple RCTs, and iden-
tiﬁed conditions where the bias in treatment effect is equal to zero.
Except for highly restrictive conditions, if belief about the treat-
ment allocation is translated into the study outcome (e.g., over or
under-reporting of the outcome), the bias is expected to be non-
zero. Thus, the authors concluded that blinding cannot guaranteeInc. This is an open access articleto prevent bias caused by belief, but emphasized that it is not their
intention to suggest that RCTs should not be blinded. They
considered deterministic/hypothetical scenarios under a type of
effective blinding, without numerical evaluation.
In this paper, we intend to study Mathieu et al.'s ﬁndings care-
fully and assess the bias in different treatment effect parameters
numerically in more practical/realistic settings, under qualitatively
different blinding scenarios, with a goal to provide a better insight
and some actionable advice for trialists, if any. In section 2, we
present background and mathematical framework. In section 3, we
perform simulation studies and summarize the ﬁndings. Discus-
sions and conclusions are provided at the end.
2. Mathematical framework
We summarize a simple, theoretical framework posited by
Mathieu et al. as basis, examine and adapt here [9]. Each cell in a
3 2 table for guess status by allocation has the number of subjects
nij, where j denotes allocation (T ¼ treatment, C ¼ control) and i
denotes belief about allocation (t ¼ treatment, u ¼ don't know,
c¼ control); see Table 1. We assume that outcomes can be distorted
via two mechanisms, where ai is the magnitude of distortion that is
independent of the true outcome Yij (e.g., ﬁxed, a priori expectation
before allocation) and bi is that proportional to the outcome (e.g.,
unblinding during trial) in both arms. Thus, the total distortion or
bias in the individual outcome due to belief in a cell is ai þ biYij; the
observed outcome isunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Table 1
Statistical notation.
Treatment Allocation (j), outcome & sample size
Guess (i) Treatment arm (T) Control arm (C)
Received treatment (t) Y 0tT ¼ YtT þ at þ btYtT ntT Y 0tC ¼ YtC þ at þ btYtC ntC
Don't know (u) Y 0uT ¼ YuT þ au þ buYuT nuT Y 0uC ¼ YuC þ au þ buYuC nuC
Received control (c) Y 0cT ¼ YcT þ ac þ bcYcT ncT Y 0cC ¼ YcC þ ac þ bcYcC ncC
See Table 1 in Mathieu et al. (2014).
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If there is no distortion, then ai ¼ bi ¼ 0 so Y0ij ¼ Yij, i.e., indi-
vidual outcome is unbiased.
We consider three treatment effect parameters: mean differ-
ence, mean ratio and odds ratio (OR) where OR is relevant when the
outcome is binary. For binary outcome, mean difference and ratio
are typically interpreted as incidence or risk difference (RD) and
risk ratio (RR) in epidemiologic and clinical trial contexts.
Let us assume the randomization of the 1:1 allocation ratio for
two treatments, and deﬁne the nij-weighted mean of all Y0ij asP
iðnijY 0ijÞ=
P
inij for j ¼ T and C. If belief about allocation is inde-
pendent of actual allocation, so niT ¼ niC ¼ ni, which can be a
speciﬁc form of effective blinding (see its connection to the
‘Wishful thinking’ scenario below) [9], then the absolute estimate
































if, but not only if, in every stratum, either (1) bi ¼ 0 or (2) YiC ¼ YiT
(i.e., there is no effect of treatment).We can further show that when
niT ¼ niC ¼ ni may or may not be true, if (3)
P
iniTai ¼ 0,P
iniTbi YiT ¼ 0,
P
iniCai ¼ 0, and
P
iniCbi YiC ¼ 0, then unbiased
estimation is achieved. Here, the conditions in (3) hold, for
example, if ntT ¼ ncT, ntC ¼ ncC, at ¼ ac, bt ¼ bc, au ¼ 0, bu ¼ 0,
YtT ¼ YcT and YtC ¼ YcC, where this scenario can be realized when
underlying true means are independent of guess (so that biases are
introduced only via a's and b's); no bias among subjects who
answered “Don't know”; and among thosewho provided treatment
guesses, biases (due to over vs. under-reporting) cancel out within
each arm. This situation can be regarded as another plausible form
of effective blinding which yields a combination of various balances
within each arm; see the ‘Random guess’ scenario below.







































if, but not only if, in every stratum, either (1) ai ¼ 0 and (1a) all bi's
are equal or (1b) all YiC's are equal and all YiT's are equal; or (2)
YiC ¼ YiT. Moreover, when niT ¼ niC ¼ ni may or may not be true, if
the same 4 conditions as in (3) above are met, unbiased estimation
is achieved. Finally, the unbiasedness of OR is even rarer, with
equality holding if, but not only if, either (1) YiC ¼ YiT or (2) ai ¼ 0
and bi ¼ 0, but unlikely otherwise. Yet, under some conditions, say,
the rare disease assumption (e.g., <10%), RR and OR would be close[10,11].
Now, we introduce different blinding scenarios through repre-
sentative guess status in (Treatment, Control) ¼ (random, random),
(correct, opposite), (correct, random), and (correct, correct), where
we will call these four classiﬁcations ‘Random guess’, ‘Wishful
thinking’, ‘Unblinded in one arm’, and ‘Unblinded in both arms’,
respectively, for convenience. Nine blinding scenarios may be
classiﬁed based on the proportion of correct guesses, and these four
scenarios have been shown to be relatively common in systematic
reviews [12e14] and are covered in this study; extensions to the
remaining ﬁve scenarios are straightforward. For example,
‘Random guess’ may correspond mathematically to blinding index
(BI) values of (0, 0), ‘Wishful thinking’ to (k, k), ‘Unblinded in one
arm’ to (k, 0), and ‘Unblinded in both arms’ to (k, k), with a positive
proportion of k, where BIs for treatment arm and control arm are
deﬁned as:
BIT ¼ ð2*ntT=ðntT þ ncTÞ  1Þ*ðntT þ ncTÞ=ðntT þ nuT þ ncTÞ;
BIC ¼ ð2*ncC=ðntC þ ncCÞ  1Þ*ðntC þ ncCÞ=ðntC þ nuC þ ncCÞ:
BI may serve as an indicator of potential unblinding through
quantifying ‘imbalance’ between the two statuses of the identiﬁed
guesses, i.e., T vs. C [15]. Here, we chose Bang et al.’s BI because it is
widely used in practice, including in meta-analyses, and it assesses
blinding separately for different arms (unlike James et al.'s BI that
provides one value) so that it could capture different blinding
patterns in different arms [12,e14,16e19]. Roughly speaking, BI ¼ 0
means that the proportions of correct and incorrect guesses are
equal, adjusting for the count of “Don't know”. Here, k ¼ 20% has
been used as an ad-hoc threshold for classiﬁcation purposes
[14,15,20]. Note that the condition, niT ¼ niC ¼ ni, imposed in
Mathieu et al. implies BIT ¼ BIC. Hence, in practice, if
BIT z BIC [ 0, say, >20%, we may designate as the ‘Wishful
thinking’ scenario. In contrast, if a set of the conditions in (3) above
are satisﬁed (e.g., ntT ¼ ncT, ntC ¼ ncC), so BITz BIC z 0, we may
designate as the ‘Random guess’ scenario. These two scenarios may
constitute effective blinding.
Although these theoretical conditions identiﬁed in simplistic
models/settings are critical in the improvement of our under-
standing about blinding and its potential impact on treatment ef-
fect, it is not straightforward to understand the extent of bias in any
given trial. Exact cancellations would be nearly impossible and
some conditions are too restrictive or highly implausible (for
example, bi ¼ b), so that bias is highly likely in most cases, espe-
cially, in more general or realistic settings we simulated below.
3. Simulation study
3.1. Conﬁguration and data generation
In this section, we examine the empirical bias in the treatment
effect by simulation in the combinations of: 1) outcomes (contin-
uous and binary); 2) parameters (mean difference/RD, mean ratio/
RR, and OR); 3) hypotheses (null and non-null effects); and 4)
different blinding scenarios. In brief, we followed Mathieu et al.'s
H. Bang / Contemporary Clinical Trials Communications 3 (2016) 117e121 119setting/framework for data presentation and generation as in
Table 1. We ﬁrst generated true outcomes and then divided into 3
subgroups based on guess status. After that, we did add or subtract
random bias in 2 guess groups, except for the “Don't know” group.
Sample size of each subgroup determines blinding index and
different blinding scenarios.
For continuous outcome, we deﬁned the relationship between
observed and true outcomes with bias factors, a's and b's:
Y 0ijl ¼ Yjl þ ail þ bilYjl
where i¼ t, u, c; j¼ T, C; and l indexes subjects within each stratum
deﬁned by i and j. Thus, Y, a and b all vary over subjects (with
subscript l), and the underlying true outcomes are assumed to be
independent of guess (no subscript i), so that the observed outcome
depends on guess i through ail and bil. For binary outcome, we
assumed the relationship between the true and observed outcomes












Y 0ijl ¼ 1
i
¼ aþ b*Iðj ¼ TÞ þ ail þ bilYjl:
In all simulations, we generated data under the null (i.e., 0 in
difference and 1 in ratio) and non-null treatment effects. For
continuous outcome, we generated true outcome data from a
normal distributionwith the variance of 1 and the difference in the
means of 0 (¼11 for null effect) and 0.3 (¼1.31 for non-null ef-
fect) so the corresponding ratios in the mean of 1 and 1.3. Simu-
lation conﬁgurations along with results are described in Table 2. For
binary outcome, we simulated data when OR of exp (0) ¼ 1 (under
the null) and exp (0.8) ¼ 2.23 (under the non-null) for treatment
effect parameter, and the results are presented in Table 3.
In general, the magnitude of over and under-reporting of the
outcomes (e.g., patient reported pain score) are limited, we inde-
pendently generated bias factors, atl and btl, from a uniform dis-
tribution of U [0, 0.4], and acl and bcl from a uniform distribution of
U [0.4, 0], while aul and bul set to 0. This means that subjects who
guess they are in treatment group tend to over-report and those in
control group tend to under-report in the balanced manner, say, by
20% under the null with baseline or ﬁxed belief only; we call this
‘Balance ¼ Yes’. In contrast, for the counterpart of ‘Balance ¼ No’,
we generated the data with the means of 0.4 and 0.2, in place of
0.2 and 0.2 above, in order to make the magnitude of over-
reporting is larger than that of under-reporting, so that cancella-
tions of the bias factors are unlikely. We tried three sub-scenarios
regarding belief status: 1) a s 0 but b ¼ 0 (i.e., belief at baseline
or ﬁxed belief, independent of outcome); 2) a ¼ 0 but b s 0 (i.e.,
bias modiﬁed by outcome); and 3) a s 0 and b s 0 (i.e., both).
The four blinding scenarios of ‘Random guess’, ‘Wishful
thinking’, ‘Unblinded in 1 arm’, and ‘Unblinded in 2 arms’ were
implemented through the BIs of (0, 0), (0.4,0.4), (0.4, 0), (0.4, 0.4),
respectively, partly guided by the recent meta-analyses on blinding
[12,13]. Here, 0.4 means that 40% of imbalance in guesses in a given
arm, for instance, 60% of subjects guessed treatment, 20% answered
‘Don't know’, and 20% guessed control among subjects in treatment
arm, where we denote as 60-20-20%. Since balance in Random
guess can be achieved in different manners, we tried the three
settings of (1) 33.3-33.3-33.3% for both arms; (2) 40-20-40% for
both arms; and (3) 40-20-40% in treatment arm and 33.3-33.3-
33.3% in control arm, which all yield BI ¼ 0. We decided to report
results from the ﬁrst setting as results were qualitatively similar.
We generated the data for 500 subjects in each arm. A set of 500
simulation runs were conducted in each combination. We reportedthe average of sample bias estimates in treatment effect parameter,
adjusting for sampling bias (i.e., subtracting the observed bias un-
der the true model); we intentionally used the raw bias so as to
closely reﬂect naturalistic situations, that is, how RCT results are
normally reported in practice, and to highlight when unbiasedness
(i.e., numerical bias of 0) is achieved. SAS 9.4 (SAS Institute, Cary,
NC) was used for data generation and analysis and codes will be
available upon request from author. We performed additional an-
alyses as secondary analyses or sensitivity checking: 1) we repeated
the entire simulation study with weaker unblinding in one arm or
both arms (say, BI ¼ 0.2 in place of 0.4); 2) we tried when true
OR < 1 instead of >1; and 3) we tried a model in the prevalence
scale, in place of the logit scale, similar to Mathieu et al.'s hypo-
thetical example. We summarized key ﬁndings in text below.
3.2. Summary of results
Main simulation results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. It is
clear overall that Random guess and Wishful thinking scenarios
which closely represent successful blinding yieldedminimal biases,
while Random guess appears to be the most ideal blinding scenario
with the estimated bias of ~0 in most balanced scenarios we tried
(Balance ¼ Yes). Bias is non-zero but relatively small in imbalanced
settings (Balance ¼ No), where a's and b's do not cancel out. Bias is
not always zero under successful blinding, especially, when treat-
ment effect is non-zero, i.e., non-null effect. Small but non-zero bias
can occur in the Wishful thinking scenario even when balances in
a's and b's are maintained. Under the null effect and successful
blinding, bias is shown to be near 0. However, if blinding is un-
successful, the null effect does not guarantee unbiasedness.
Observed bias tends to be larger for ratio measure, compared to
difference measure, and bias could be ampliﬁed in OR, compared to
RR, when OR lies in 1 to∞, particularlywhen OR[ RR for non-rare
outcome. As theory predicts, unbiasedness is most difﬁcult to be
achieved for OR, compared to RD or RR, as numerical cancellations
of biases are unlikely. It is also noteworthy that increased
unblinding (i.e., two arms rather than one arm, a higher degree of
unblinding in a given arm, as 0 and bs 0) and larger imbalance in
the magnitude of over vs. under-reporting can yield larger bias.
Thus, wemay interpret that balances in guess of T vs. C as well as in
over vs. under-reporting lead to more cancellations in biases as
theory predicts. Two different scales e prevalence and logit e
provide comparable results. When we tried the settings with
OR < 1, we reached biases in a lot smaller magnitude. But it is well
explained by the range issue, i.e., 0e1 vs. 1∞.
4. Discussion
In this paper, we studied the numerical behaviors of bias in
treatment effect when outcomes are affected by subjects' beliefs
about treatment they received. Statistical investigation of the po-
tential effect of (un)blinding on treatment effect is highly limited,
while anecdotal evidence, concept and intuition have been utilized
and reported in clinical communities; blinding must be a good
thing, especially double blinding [7,8,12]. Mathieu et al. [9] pro-
vided a theoretical analysis of simplistic and hypothetical frame-
work that demonstrates effective blinding cannot guarantee
unbiasedness in treatment effect, which may yield important im-
plications in RCT practice because most trialists and practitioners
regard blinding is an essential component to minimize various
biases.
We examined their important ﬁndings in a numerical study in
realistic and diverse settings, and conﬁrmed their claims are cor-
rect. Yet, observed bias tends be small under the original and newly
identiﬁed settings of effective blinding, so that trialists and readers
Table 2
Simulation for continuous outcome.
Treatment effect Belief status Blinding scenario Bias in mean
difference
Bias in mean ratio
Balance
Yes No Yes No
Null Baseline Random guess 0 0 0 0
Wishful thinking 0 0 0 1
Unblinded-1 arm 8 13 7 12
Unblinded-2 arms 16 24 16 24
Null Depends on outcome Random guess 0 0 0 0
Wishful thinking 0 0 0 0
Unblinded-1 arm 9 14 8 13
Unblinded-2 arms 16 24 17 24
Null Both Random guess 0 0 0 0
Wishful thinking 0 0 1 1
Unblinded-1 arm 16 27 16 24
Unblinded-2 arms 32 47 36 49
Non-null Baseline Random guess 0 0 0 2
Wishful thinking 0 0 2 4
Unblinded-1 arm 8 13 7 10
Unblinded-2 arms 16 24 19 25
Non-null Depends on outcome Random guess 0 2 1 1
Wishful thinking 2 6 0 1
Unblinded-1 arm 11 20 11 17
Unblinded-2 arms 18 30 21 31
Non-null Both Random guess 0 2 0 1
Wishful thinking 3 7 1 3
Unblinded-1 arm 19 33 18 25
Unblinded-2 arms 34 54 43 58
N ¼ 500 subjects per arm. 500 simulations were performed.
Bias ¼ observed-truth, adjusted for sampling bias and multiplied by 100.
Table 3
Simulation for binary outcome.
Treatment effect Belief status Blinding scenario Bias in risk
difference
Bias in risk ratio Bias in odds ratio
Balance
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Null Baseline Random guess 0 0 0 1 0 1
Wishful thinking 0 0 1 1 1 1
Unblinded-1 arm 1 1 7 13 8 15
Unblinded-2 arms 1 2 15 26 16 29
Null Depends on outcome Random guess 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wishful thinking 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unblinded-1 arm 0 0 1 1 1 1
Unblinded-2 arms 0 0 2 2 2 3
Null Both Random guess 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wishful thinking 0 0 1 1 1 1
Unblinded-1 arm 1 2 8 15 9 17
Unblinded-2 arms 2 3 17 30 19 34
Non-null Baseline Random guess 0 0 0 5 0 4
Wishful thinking 1 1 2 9 0 5
Unblinded-1 arm 1 3 13 19 19 32
Unblinded-2 arms 2 4 30 43 40 63
Non-null Depends on outcome Random guess 0 0 0 5 0 7
Wishful thinking 1 1 5 11 7 16
Unblinded-1 arm 1 1 7 14 10 20
Unblinded-2 arms 1 2 9 17 12 25
Non-null Both Random guess 0 1 0 1 1 5
Wishful thinking 1 3 3 3 7 12
Unblinded-1 arm 2 5 21 33 31 55
Unblinded-2 arms 3 6 40 63 56 97
N ¼ 500 subjects per arm. 500 simulations were performed.
Bias ¼ observed-truth, adjusted for sampling bias and multiplied by 100.
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ded RCT being the gold standard. We also found that bias estimates
can be different in different parameters/settings, and bias can be
the largest when blinding is broken e the more severe the
unblinding, the larger the bias. We also identiﬁed speciﬁc contextswhere bias is nearly 0. We still believe that the lesson that blinding
does not guarantee unbiased treatment effect is important, simi-
larly to the lesson that another norm, the intent-to-treat principle,
does not guarantee unbiased estimation under noncompliance
[21]. Although bias could heavily depend on the parameter of
H. Bang / Contemporary Clinical Trials Communications 3 (2016) 117e121 121choice (e.g., RD vs. RR vs. OR; OR > 1 vs. <1), we do not think that
parameter should be selected based on the biases we observed/
discussed here.
It could be difﬁcult, if not impossible, to control or measure
some a's (say, belief before randomization) and b's (e.g., belief
developed during trial), but it may be still important to do our best
to make bias factors as small as possible or more balanced in
opposite directions (e.g., atz ac, btz bc), which could be better
achieved when patients are more confused between the two in-
terventions under comparison, with the entire team's consorted
efforts and novel tricks.
The limitations of our study and discussion points should be
noted. First, we employed simple settings and models. We believe
that simple settings (in model, parameter, classiﬁcation, etc.) are
preferred as fundamental and general behaviors of the operational
characteristics are better elucidated. Particularly, we focused on the
allocation ratio of 1:1 as the interpretation of blinding success
under other ratios might not be straightforward, say, is the null
value 50% or 33% under 1:2? More advanced designs and models
have been proposed and may be considered in future [16,22e24].
Second, statistically speaking, this problem is a special case with
measurement error or misclassiﬁcation in outcomes [25]. However,
we are cautious to recommend statistical correction with hard-to-
satisfy-or-verify assumptions partly because of non-statistical
reason; more data collection about blinding may do more harm
than good [20,21]. A more desirable approach could be rigorous
pilot testing of blinding before actual trial [26], together with better
adherence to blinding protocol [5,20], and stratiﬁed analyses based
on guess status as exploratory or secondary analysis, similarly to
stratiﬁed analyses based on compliance status [23,27,28]. Third, we
used blinding scenario classiﬁcation with previously used names
based on BI for convenience and evaluation purpose. Blinding is a
qualitative and empirically unveriﬁable issue in general, so BI
which is a function of the proportions of correct and incorrect
guesses can only serve a proxy measure, and different underlying
phenomena are possible under the same name. For example,
“Wishful thinking” could actually reﬂect a situationwhere anything
looking like treatment is perceived as real, rather than a well-
known psychological tendency to wish to receive a real or better
treatment.
In conclusion, we validated Mathieu et al.’s theoretical ﬁndings
(i.e., bias cannot be eliminated even when perfect blinding is ach-
ieved) in our simulations. We also found that observed bias could
be relatively small in various realistic settings when blinding is
successful in two speciﬁc ways or degrees of over vs. under-
reporting due to beliefs are comparable, particularly when treat-
ment effect is near null. Thus, clinical implications of theoretical
biases on the current RCT practice may not be substantial although
it is ideal to remember possible bias, whenever we interpret results
from RCTs where blinding could be more problematic. Clinical trial
team should do their best to aim at “Random guess” or “Wishful
thinking” throughout the trial in terms of blinding. Finally, our
study reinforces the old wisdoms, perfect blinding is better than
imperfect blinding, and imperfect blinding is better than no
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